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CENTRAL PLANNING OR MARKET
CONTROLS IN LEGAL EDUCATION:
HOW TO DECIDE WHAT LAWYERS
SHOULD KNOW
MICHAEL K. MCCHRYSTAL*
The American Bar Association Task Force on Law Schools and the
Profession issued a report in 1992, generally known as the MacCrate
Report,' calling for a reassessment and changes respecting the education
of lawyers. The major feature of the MacCrate Report is its characteriza-
tion of the practice of law as a composite of certain skills and profession-
al values, many of which are inadequately taught by the institutions
responsible for the education of lawyers.2 The MacCrate Report also
emphasizes that legal education is a career-long undertaking and that the
proper education of lawyers is not the sole responsibility of law schools.3
The State Bar of Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education
publishes its Final Report and Recommendations4 in this issue of the
Marquette Law Review. The Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education
Report represents an important step in the formal response of the State
Bar of Wisconsin to the MacCrate Report. Like its ABA parent, the
Report contains many astute observations and sound views. It is clear,
concise, and accessible. It makes an important contribution to a process
that has spurred considerable discussion of the state of the legal
profession. For the most part, these discussions are healthy because they
are real: they often entail much more that the pious platitudes or
ponderous pessimism too often heard when lawyers discuss their calling.
Serious problems in the profession and in legal institutions are being
discussed seriously in this process.
Having said this, I must also say that the Wisconsin Commission on
Legal Education Report and the MacCrate Report have their problems.
The State Bar Commission characterizes its Report as "a stimulus and
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. Legal Education & Professional Development- An Educational Continuum, Report
of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992 A.B.A. SEC.
LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS [hereinafter MacCrate Report].
2. See generally id.
3. lId
4. Commission on Legal Education, Final Report and Recommendations, 1996 STATE
BAR OF WISCONSIN (1997) [hereinafter Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report].
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starting point for an ongoing exchange within the profession., 5 In that
spirit, and though I endorse much of what the Report says, my focus will
be on two serious shortcomings that should be considered by those who
may consider implementing the State Bar Commission's recommenda-
tions. These shortcomings can summarized as follows: First. While the
professional performance of a lawyer depends in significant measure on
the lawyer's skills and values, it also depends in significant measure on the
lawyer's knowledge, and this third essential dimension of performance gets
dangerously short shrift in the Wisconsin Commission's Report. Second:
The Report correctly identifies a number of problems in the existing legal
profession, but its recommendations unfairly burden persons who are not
yet lawyers.
Thus, my criticisms are directed at the Commission's views that
professional performance can be adequately described in terms of skills
and values and that remedies to today's problems principally should
burden only future lawyers.
The first shortcoming in the Wisconsin Commission on Legal Report
is its adoption of "the principle that the practice of law is built around
a set of skills and values that can be identified, analyzed, and taught."6
The problem with this formulation is its relegation of other forms of
knowledge to secondary status.7 Substantive legal topics have dominat-
ed legal education, both in law schools and in continuing education
programs, because knowing the law has long been thought to be an
essential part of quality law practice. The new characterization of the
practice of law as a composite of skills and values challenges these
popular perceptions and practices respecting the central role of legal
knowledge.
The case for emphasizing skills and values at the expense of legal
knowledge is unconvincing. The MfacCrate Report refers to the current
5. Id. at 15 (quoting Legal Education & Professional Development-An Educational
Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap,
1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR [hereinafter "MacCrate
Report"].
6. Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 4, at 17.
7. The distinctions among "knowledge," "skills," and "values" are not, of course, very
sharp. Legal knowledge, in my view, involves more than the ability to state accurately the
controlling legal doctrine governing a particular legal question. At the least, it also encom-
passes a knowledge of the dominant economic, social, and moral concerns that shape doctrine
and decision-making in the field as well as a general familiarity with the contexts in which
issues in the field arise. "Substantive" law courses seem generally to be concerned with these
dimensions of the subject, although a focus which is particularly "theoretical" or "practical"
may ignore some of these dimensions of legal knowledge of a subject.
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era as "an age of specialization,"' which in its view is driven by
"changing law and new complexities."9 Responding to this phenomenon
in law practice, law schools are constantly driven to add new courses to
reflect substantive fields of practice that are experiencing rapid growth.
Current examples can be drawn from fields such as intellectual property,
health law, and international law. Specialization, which is increasingly
the organizing principle around which law practices are built, provides
powerful evidence that law practice is "built around" legal knowledge as
much as around skills and values.
The characterization of professional practice as being based on skills
and values flows from valuable research being done in the social
sciences, some of which the Wisconsin Commission discusses,10 which
suggests that behavior can be parsed into tasks and objectives which
provide the best measures of performance. It represents a practical
effort to objectify performance, so that it is most susceptible of being
learned and evaluated.
Knowledge can be objectified as well, but the objectification of
knowledge has been substantially tainted by its association with rote
learning and because of the gender and cultural bias often reflected in
decisions about what bits of knowledge "count."" These phenomena
may help explain the ascendancy of "skills" and "values" and decline of
"knowledge" in the rhetoric of professional performance.
There are also reasons for de-emphasizing knowledge that are more
specific to the legal profession. Lawyers who specialize in different fields
will have legal knowledge that overlaps, but they will market themselves
on the basis of differences in their legal knowledge. Specialization in law
practice suggests that the profession is balkanized in terms of knowledge.
A study of what lawyers must learn to be good practitioners that
emphasizes legal knowledge must in large measure conclude "different
strokes for different folks." This leads to market controls on legal
education rather than control through central planning. On the other
hand, an emphasis on skills and values may, for many, paint a believable
picture of a profession sharing common traits. This permits the form of
central planning that lies at the heart of the Wisconsin Commission's
8. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 46.
9. l at 40.
10. Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 4, at 4.
11. Skills are frequently a type of knowledge; the knowing of how to perform certain
tasks. Some skills, however, may depend on a trait that is substantially inherent in the
individual and may, or may not, be notably improved (e.g., whether one's speaking voice has
a pleasing or irritating quality).
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recommendations.
There are two very significant issues at work here. One is the issue
suggested above of who is in charge. Will the market dictate what form
legal education takes or will it be the product of central planning, with
all that entails? The other is the issue of whether we are one legal
profession or many, and, if we are many, how we are distinguishable
from other occupations.
Whatever may be the answer to these two significant issues, what
should not be ignored is that a lawyer's knowledge base, beyond skills
and values, is crucial to the practice of law. When the Wisconsin
Commission on Legal Education Report departs from the MacCrate
Report by adding "Judgment" to the set of values that defines the
profession, it notes the role of knowledge in making a good lawyer. "To
exercise good judgment," the Wisconsin Report states, "one needs
considerable knowledge about a wide range of subjects."12  The
Wisconsin Report further notes "the extensive information base that fine
lawyers can bring into play."13
These points are well taken, but we should recognize that extensive
knowledge is crucial to law practice in many ways in addition to being
an attribute of judgment. It is central to many, if not most, of the skills
and values identified in both reports as defining the practice of law.
Problem solving, legal analysis, legal research, factual investigation,
etc.-the skills identified in the MacCrate Report--cannot be employed
effectively without knowing the law relating to a client's problem and the
social and economic context in which that problem arises. Moreover,
legal research in law practice does not by itself reliably correct knowl-
edge deficiencies. Self-directed and independent book learning can teach
a person a great deal over time, but in the complex, practical, and time-
pressured world of law practice, it is no substitute for extensive prior
study, reflection, and experience. Specialization underscores this fact
with particular eloquence.
Professional drift by lawyers within their specialized fields away from
a single legal profession may be a process, like continental drift, that
cannot be reversed. Some lawyers may identify with their specialty more
than with the legal profession as a whole, particularly when push comes
to shove. Professor Ted Schneyer's work, for example, describes the
conflicting visions of lawyering advanced by various specialized lawyer
12. Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 4, at 18.
13. Id.
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groups as those conflicts have played out in the making of ethics rules. 4
If we are to be candid, we should recognize that generalizations
about lawyers are always a risky business, whether they relate to
knowledge, skills, or values. Even basic skills like legal research are not
used regularly in all forms of law practice. Moreover, a professional
value such as "striving to promote justice, fairness[,] and morality""5 will
have markedly different meanings for different lawyers.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the effort to identify our common
traits and interests as lawyers is a worthy project. What we derive from
such study is a sense of the extent to which one license, one educational
path, and one regulatory regime fit reality. This is not an all-or-nothing
proposition. A licensing scheme, an educational program, and a
regulatory regime can be based on a recognition that there are both
commonalities and differences within the profession. The Model Rides
of Professional Conduct, for example, while establishing a regulatory
scheme for all lawyers, speaks in certain provisions particularly to
prosecutors," criminal defense lawyers, 7 arbitrators," and lobby-
ists. 9 Law school curricula typically require some courses, but leave
most course selections to students' discretion within a wide range of
options.
While identifying in some useful ways various common lawyer traits,
the MacCrate Report and the Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education
Report falter to the extent that fundamental differences are glossed over
or ignored. This is most apparent and most troubling in the concept of
law practice as consisting centrally only of skills and values. This
skills/values concept of law practice is troubling in being almost
exclusively lawyer-regarding and not adequately attentive to the context
of the matters in which legal services are sought.
The Wisconsin Report offers greater balance and insight than its
recommendations reflect. Consider this discussion of the role of the law
schools:
A professional cannot learn "the law" in the abstract, divorced
14. See, e.g., TED SCHNEYER, PROFESSIONAL AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE CASE OF
HOUSE COUNSEL (Institute for Legal Studies Working Paper No. 3, 1988); Ted Schneyer,
Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Business Debate as A
Case Study, 35 ARIz. L. REv. 363 (1993).
15. Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 5, at 90.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.8 (1992).
17. See, ag., id. Rule 1.2(a), Rule 3.1.
18. Id. Rule 1.12.
19. Id. Rule 3.9.
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from how lawyers use the law, apply the law, research the law,
advise clients about the law, and look to the law to solve
problems. Likewise, one cannot function as a competent lawyer
having learned merely the discrete tasks of lawyering (such as
drafting a will or preparing a deed) without understanding the law
that underlies those functions.
Knowing the law implies that one knows what to do with the
law. The knowledge that law students seek in law school (and
that the public and the profession expect them to acquire in law
school) is not just knowledge of the subject of law, but also
knowledge of the performance of law.'
Thus, the Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report values
"knowledge of the subject of law" as something "the public and the
profession expect" lawyers to possess. When it comes to the Commis-
sion's action agenda, however, this knowledge component disappears,
drowned in enthusiasm for the skills/values concept of lawyering.21
A new lawyer in a new job working for a new set of clients in a new
field of law may well need to learn the law relevant to her work as a first
priority. Learning the law means learning about the issues, values, goals,
risks, and priorities for clients like her clients. Learning the law is a
client-centered exercise in a way that learning skills and professional
values is not. The substance of substantive law relates to client
problems, client goals, and public goods; it relates to life beyond the law
office and court house; it relates to the public that lawyers serve. This
does not denigrate the importance of skills and professional values. It
only emphasizes that lawyers know something worth knowing that lies
beyond professional skills and values.
"Lawyer-regarding" concerns (i.e., concerns that are unique to
lawyers) must be attended to if we are to cohere as a profession.
"Client-regarding" concerns must dominate our professional outlook,
however, if we are to justify our professional role. The law itself is
client-regarding in largest measure; our knowledge of it must be central
to our work.
The Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report draws
pertinent analogies between the legal profession and other professional
groups in the context of skill development.' Pursuing this analogy,
20. Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 4, at 27.
21. Professor Lilly expresses similar concern about the de-emphasis of "academic law"
in the Wisconsin Report. Graham C. Lilly, Skills, Values, and Legal Education: The MacCrate
Report Finds a Home In Wisconsin?, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 751, 755-58 (1997).
22. See generally Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 4, at 4-5.
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consider the weight we attach to the physician's knowledge of human
anatomy, the forms that disease takes, and other kinds of knowledge that
are "patient-centered." Skill in treatment is crucial, to be sure, as are
the physician's professional values, but knowing what to treat is essential
as well.
The Wisconsin Report says it rejects the dichotomies distinguishing
substance from procedure, skills and values from substantive law, and
even skills from values.' But the Report also adopts a set of recom-
mendations that seriously de-value learning the law while substantially
emphasizing skills and values. The Report's recommendations do not
mention the words "knowledge" or "law" (except as part of the phrase
"law school"), while mentioning "skills" ten times and "values" eleven
times.24 Perhaps this reflects a judgment that the legal education of
lawyers with respect to knowing the law is already excellent and not in
need of new strategies. But any "evaluation of the status of legal
education in Wisconsin,"' which the Wisconsin Report claims to be,
should not treat learning the law as secondary or unimportant. Nor
should legal educators blithely assume that at least they do a good job
of this.' Learning the law is too important.
Although the Wisconsin Report understates the importance of legal
knowledge to law practice, its observations about the importance of
professional skills and values are generally well taken. Law students and
lawyers have too few opportunities to develop their skills and values
through formal educational programming. The Wisconsin Report's
response to this problem, however, is old hat in the tradition of
organized bar appraisals of the status of the legal profession: impose
additional requirements on persons seeking admission to the bar and
leave licensed lawyers alone.
While obstacles to bar admission have been added throughout the
century, obstacles to continued licensure have changed very little. Once
in possession of a license to practice law, very few positive steps are
required beyond an annual payment. The only significant additional
burden beyond payment of fees is the continuing education requirement
23. lId at 27.
24. Id. at xiii.
25. l& at 3.
26. Professor Underwood, in his essay in this Symposium, criticizes legal educators who
are too academic and research-oriented in their "substantive" courses. William D.
Underwood, The Report of the Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education: A Road Map to
Needed Reform, or Just Another Report?, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 771, 772-775 (1997) (text
accompanying notes 7-22).
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in Wisconsin and many states, and even that is limited to attendance and
reporting responsibilities rather than evaluation and testing. (Imagine
bar applicants being required to attend law school without being
evaluated or tested in any manner while in school or in seeking
admission to the bar.)
It is fairly easy to impose burdens on lawyers-yet-to-be, who have
little if any voice in discussions of such matters and whose entry into the
profession is not wholeheartedly welcomed.27 It is a major risk to place
additional burdens on licensed lawyers, who pay the bills and vote for
bar officers. Thus, while the Commission finds that legal education is a
career-long continuum' and that the practice of law is built around an
identifiable and learnable set of skills and values,29 the Commission
recommends that new lawyers be required to take coursework in these
areas,0 but that experienced lawyers only have such programming made
available to them.31
This disparity says a lot. For one thing, it seems to display consider-
able skepticism about the market's response to continuing education
programming in the areas of skills and values. The requirement
recommended for new lawyers implies that they would not enroll in skills
and values courses if they were not required to do so. The absence of
a requirement for experienced lawyers, given the one imposed on new
lawyers, suggests that experienced lawyers already possess these skills
and values, a conclusion undermined by the Wisconsin Report, 2 or that
they would revolt at being required to take skills and values courses.
The market in continuing legal education (CLE) programs suggests
either that lawyers are not interested in skills and values courses or that
CLE providers believe such interest is lacking. The Wisconsin Commis-
sion on Legal Education Report notes that "[v]irtually all current CLE
programs emphasize substantive legal topics."33 One supposes that this
supply reflects demand, particularly considering that the State Bar itself
27. My colleague, Peter Rofes, points out that the courts take a dim view, from a
constitutional perspective, of legislation targeted against persons excluded from the law-making
process. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n. 4 (1938).
28. Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 4, at 1-2.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id at 49 (Recommendation No. 8).
31. Id. at 57 (Recommendation No. 11).
32. See id. at 57 (Recommendation No. 11) (recommending that additional CLE courses
be offered to the existing offerings). If the proposed requirements are imposed on new
lawyers, the absence of this imposition on experienced lawyers suggests that they already
possess the requisite skills and values.
33. Id. at 50.
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is a primary supplier of CLE programs and is dedicated to meeting the
needs of its members.
There seems to be a tremendous gulf implied in the Report, between
the types of CLE programs that lawyers, particularly new lawyers, want
and the type they need. This conclusion, though, seems markedly
premature and may well be wrong. Until CLE providers, particularly the
State Bar, offer such programming, it will be difficult to know the extent
of the demand. The approach in the Wisconsin Report is to manufacture
by legal compulsion a demand for skills and values CLE programs. This
is the wrong place to start. The first step should be to supply courses of
this type, aggressively market them, perhaps even subsidize their start-up
cost with revenues from other programs in order that they may be
competitively priced, and then see if the demand is there. This market
perspective likely would have produced a very different Report, one
focused on strategies for implementing skills and values CLE program-
ming that would attract an enrollment of interested lawyers.
Lawyers acting within the CLE market might respond differently to
skills courses than to values courses, were such courses regularly offered.
Improving one's professional skills probably enhances one's market value
as a lawyer (although perhaps to a lesser degree than improving one's
legal knowledge, judging from the relative success of current CLE
offerings). The effect of improved professional values on a lawyer's
worth in the marketplace may seem less direct. Thus, values courses
might prove to be less popular than skills course. Skills courses, it
should be noted, generally draw good enrollments in law schools.
Courses discretely devoted to professional values are rarely offered as
law school electives. Thus, in the law school marketplace of courses,
skills courses seem to do pretty well, though there is little experience to
judge how values courses would do.
The strategy of the Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education
Report is requirement-oriented rather than market-oriented and, thus,
quite paternalistic. In a competitive market for jobs and clients, new
lawyers are likely to choose CLE programs that are, in the main, good
for them. Given the wildly diverse circumstances in which new lawyers
find themselves and the wildly diverse objectives they seek, they
probably know better what is best for them, as well. When the market
has not been given a serious chance, it is premature to start imposing
requirements. The State Bar and other CLE providers should look to
themselves before looking to the rule-making powers of the Supreme
Court, to improve the quality and relevance of CLE programming for
new lawyers. New CLE requirements for new lawyers may be a quick
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fix (or economic boon) to CLE providers, but it is a serious burden to
new lawyers. In the CLE marketplace, if well-designed skills and values
courses are aggressively marketed and competitively priced and still do
not draw attendance, the set of premises on which the Wisconsin Report
is based should be re-thought. In my view, neither the Wisconsin
Commission on Legal Education Report nor the MacCrate Report has
made an adequate case for imposing additional burdens on newly
licensed lawyers. If the profession, acting as a whole in the CLE
marketplace, does not see substantial merit in skills and values courses,
perhaps the bar leaders got it wrong in deciding what type of post-law
school education lawyers need.
The extent of the burden of the proposed requirement also needs to
be seriously evaluated. Costs could be high in producing skills and
values courses, particularly given the recommendation that faculty should
be specially trained for these courses, that the methodology should be
interactive, and that feedback should be provided.' The Wisconsin
Report expresses some concern about costs, but concludes that new
lawyers taking these courses should pay the freight.35
The reasoning supporting the recommendation that new lawyers pay
for the additional costs created by new requirements imposed upon them
is strained. One reason given is that Marquette and Wisconsin graduates
admitted under diploma privilege save the cost of the bar examination,
so presumably their overall costs in securing a license will remain
reasonable even with the added cost of a new skills and values education
requirement. Reference is even made to "the former requirement of a
six-month unpaid apprenticeship,"36 though that requirement has been
gone for decades. Cost projections are not substantiated, except for a
reference to a single State Bar offering made four years ago.37
Any way you cut it, the Wisconsin Report's recommendations would
increase the cost and burden of becoming a lawyer in Wisconsin. And
this is recommended notwithstanding the findings in the report that law
school graduates are already burdened with increasing levels of
educational indebtedness 3 and that those entering the profession face
greater competition for employment than in the past.39 This raises
34. Il at 51 (Recommendation No. 9).
35. IcL at 55.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id. at 6.
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issues of fundamental fairness and access to the profession, issues not
carefully addressed.
The rush to require more of new lawyers is flawed, therefore, in
several respects. It is not even-handed, in that the burdens are, as usual,
placed only on new lawyers. It is not timely because the market has not
been given an opportunity to show that the proposal of skills and values
courses is workable or desired. And it is paternalistic in assuming that
new lawyers, who more than any other class of lawyers are sensitive to
their professional inadequacies, are incapable of identifying those
inadequacies and correcting them.
A variety of strategies are available to improve the quality of the
profession. The organized bar offers too narrow a focus, in my view,
when it seeks solutions to problems occurring throughout the profession
by focusing so dominantly on the education of law students and new
lawyers. Changes in the bar examination, periodic testing of experienced
lawyers, and skills and specialization certification programs are some of
the strategies that could make a difference in the quality of the
profession generally. These solutions can be frighteningly intrusive, and
so we tend not to discuss them, even when they are highly relevant to
the issues at hand. Instead, we look to the voiceless, not-yet-members
of the bar, hoping in -good faith that, if we burden them further today,
we will provide a benefit for all a generation from now. We should not
forget, though, that these not-yet-members of the bar already shoulder
a heavier burden than any generation of lawyers before them. Loaded
with heavy debts, they encounter a crowded marketplace dominated by
experienced specialists and driven by commercial goals and constraints.
They need the freedom to make their way, and we should be wary of
placing obstacles in their paths, unless we have proven the need for those
obstacles.

